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in the opinion accompanying an award, which permits the inference
that the arbitrator may have exceeded his authority, is not a reason for
refusing to enforce this award."4 1 But, primarily, the Supreme Court
felt that the Court of Appeals merely differed with the construction of
the contract that the arbitrator gave. To allow a vacation on this ground
would permit courts to review the merits of every construction of the
contract, but this is anathema to the Supreme Court.
The Court's attempt to prevent a review of the merits by a court
seems to have resulted in ignoring the view taken by the Court of Ap-
peals and by Justice Whittaker in the dissenting opinion in the Enter-
prise Co. case. They maintained that there existed a question of exceed-
ing given authority rather than one of interpreting the contract dif-
ferently. The Court of Appeals cited several cases which contained es-
tablished law that "rights [under a collective bargaining agreement]
remain in force only for the life of the contract unless renewed by
subsequent contract or preserved by statute. 14 2 The arbitrator's author-
ity comes from the contract and since there was no contract governing
the time that part of the award covered, it seems that the arbitrator
could have been adjudged to have acted outside his given authority.
The Supreme Court seemed to feel that the best way to effectuate
the labor arbitration process was to prohibit courts from weighing the
merits of a grievance. It was this idea that permeated the decisions of
the above three cases and gave rise to their results. In the field of labor
arbitration, definite roles are now allocated to the courts and to the
arbitrators, roles which are to be played in the advancement of industrial
self-government.
ROGER E. WALSH
The Trustee's Status as a Hypothetical Lien Creditor Under
Section 70 (c) of the Bankruptcy Act: Constance v. Harvey Over-
ruled-In Lewis v. Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit,' the bank-
rupt borrowed money from the respondent on November 4, 1957, giving
a chattel mortgage on his automobile as security. Under Michigan law,
such mortgages were void as against creditors of the mortgagor unless
recorded immediately. 2 Respondent's mortgage was not recorded until
four days later on November 8, 1957, but no creditor had extended
credit in the interim between the execution and the recordation of the
mortgage. However, after the mortgagor filed a voluntary petition in
41 Id. at 598.
42 Enterprise Wheel and Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F. 2d 327, 331
(4th Cir. 1959).
1 364 U.S. 603 (1961).
2 MICH. COMp. LAWS s.566.140 (1948) as amended by PUBLIc Acr No. 233-
(1957). In 1959, by PUBLIC Acr No. 110, a 10-day grace period is now allowed
for the recording of chattel mortgages.
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bankruptcy 5 months later, the trustee in bankruptcy sought to avoid
the mortgage under Section 70(c) of the Bankruptcy Act, which pro-
vides in part:
The trustee, as to all property, whether or not coming into pos-
session or control of the court, upon which a creditor of the
bankrupt could have obtained a lien by legal or equitable pro-
ceedings at the date of bankruptcy, shall be deemed vested as of
such date with all the rights, remedies, and powers of a creditor
then holding a lien thereon by such proceedings, whether or not
such a creditor actually exists. 3
The referee held for the trustee, concluding that under the Michigan
statute a simple contract creditor could have avoided the mortgage had
he extended credit during the 4 days when the mortgage was "off rec-
ord," and therefore the trustee could claim the same right, even though
no such creditor existed. The District Court overruled the referee, and
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Because of the conflict between that de-
cision and the decision of the Second Circuit in Constance v. Harvey,4
the Supreme Court granted certiorari, and affirmed the Court of Ap-
peals. Thus the Supreme Court has settled an important question as to
the rights, remedies, and powers of the trustee as a hypothetical lien
creditor under the "strong-arm" clause of the Bankruptcy Act.
The interpretive issue raised in the Lewis case first arose in 1954,
when the court in Constance v. Harvey5 announced sua sponte that Sec-
tion 70(c) permitted the trustee, as an "ideal" lien creditor as of the
date of bankruptcy, to set aside a chattel mortgage property recorded
over a year before the petition was filed, but not recorded within a
reasonable time after its execution, as required by New York law." In
New York, as in Michigan, such security transactions not recorded
within the required period were subject to attack by interim general
creditors without notice. As in the Lewis case, there was no such creditor,
but the trustee was allowed to assume such a status. While recognizing
that the trustee's lien arises at the date of bankruptcy, the court er-
roneously assumed that his status as a hypothetical general creditor
was not tied to that date, so that he was deemed to have extended credit
during the period when it was most advantageous to do so. 7
The Constance theory has caused great consternation among security
3 66 Stat. 429 (1952), 11 U.S.C. §110(c) (1952).
4 215 F. 2d 571 (2d Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 913 (1955).
5 Ibid.
632 N.Y. CONSOL. LAWS §230 (McKinney, 1940). The statute itself provides no
specific time for recording, but the New York courts have interpreted it as
requiring recordation within a reasonable time. Karst v. Gane, 136 N.Y. 316,
32 N.E. 1073 (1893).
7 The Constance case was reluctantly followed in Conti v. Volper, 229 F. 2d
317 (2d Cir. 1956). It was rejected as unsound in In re Billings, 170 F. Supp .253(W. D. Mo. 1959) and In re American Textile Printers Co., 1952 F. Supp.
901 (D.C. N.j. 1957).
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lenders and bankruptcy authorities for three basic reasons. First, as the
court points out in the Leis case, the history of the various versions
of Section 70(c) from 1910 down to 1952 when it was cast in its present
form indicates one consistent theory, i.e., that the rights of creditors-
whether they are existing or hypothetical-to which the trustee succeeds
are to be ascertained as of "the date of bankruptcy," not at an anterior
point of time. The predecessor of Section 70(c) was Section 47(a) (2)
of the 1910 Act,8 which was enacted to correct the decision of York
Manufacturing Co. v. Cassell,9 in which the Supreme Court held that
the trustee merely acquired the rights of the bankrupt himself, and
therefore could not attack an unfiled conditional sales contract which
was valid between the parties. Congress, therefore, gave him the rights
of a creditor holding a lien by legal or equitable proceedings upon all
property in the custody of the bankruptcy court. Then in Bailey v. Baker
Ice Machine Co., 10 the trustee sought to exercise this lien to set aside
a conditional sales contract, which by Kansas statute was void as against
creditors obtaining a lien upon the property prior to recording. The con-
tract was filed prior to the petition in bankruptcy, however, and the court
for the first time held that the trustee's lien arises as of that date, with-
out any relation back to the period when the contract was not perfected.
This decision was codified in the amendment of 1938 by the Chandler
Act," and has remained in the subsequent amendments of 1950 and
1952,12 which extended the trustee's lien to property not in the possession
of the bankruptcy court, but in which the bankrupt may have an inter-
est, or may have ostensible ownership. In addition, there were certain
changes in phraseology, but the crucial "date of bankruptcy" has re-
mained the point at which the validity of the transaction may be tested
under this section of the Act.
Secondly, the purpose of the strong-arm clause is to enable the
trustee to set aside secret or otherwise unperfected liens and transfers
for the benefit of all the bankrupt's creditors. In cases where there has
been a delay in perfecting the transaction, but no creditor has been in-
jured thereby, the court in the Lewis case points out that the position
advanced by the trustee would
... enrich unsecured creditors at the expense of secured creditors,
creating a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of
bankruptcy.... Congress in striking a balance between secured
and unsecured creditors has provided for specific periods of
repose beyond which transactions of the bankrupt prior to bank-
ruptcy may no longer be upset-except and unless existing credit-
ors can set them aside. Yet if we construe §70(c) as petitioner
8 Act of June 25, 1910, §8, 36 Stat. 838.
9 201 U.S. 344 (1906).
10239 U.S. 268 (1915).
"152 Stat. 881 (1938).
12 64 Stat. 26 (1950), 66 Stat. 430, 11 U.S.C. §110(c) (1952).
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does, there would be no period of repose. Security transactions
entered into in good faith years before the bankruptcy could be
upset if the trustee were ingenious enough to conjure up a hypo-
thetical situation in which a hypothetical creditor might have had
such a right....
That is too great a wrench for us to give the bankruptcy sys-
tem, absent a plain indication from Congress which is lacking
here.13
Since the priority of the trustee's lien is determined by reference
to applicable state law, the result in the Lewis decision will be felt most
strongly in the minority of states which allow general creditors to attack
unperfected security transactions.' 4 As a number of writers have pointed
out, the rights of a lien creditor naturally encompass the lesser rights
of a general unsecured creditor. But to prevent the anomalous result
of permitting the trustee to assume greater rights as a general creditor
than he would have as a lien creditor, the hypothetical extension of
credit and the general levy of legal or equitable process must both occur
at the date of bankruptcy.' 5
Finally, the Lewis decision maintains the proper distinction between
Section 70(c), in which the trustee's rights are not dependent upon the
existence of an actual creditor, and the derivative rights of the trustee
under Section 70(e),"' by which the trustee may avoid any transfer
made or suffered by the bankrupt which an existing creditor having a
provable claim in bankruptcy could have avoided under any State or
Federal law. The latter Section had been rendered superfluous under the
Constance theory of Section 70(c), since he was able to "relate back"
his status without stepping into the shoes of an existing creditor.
The Lewis decision thus represents a significant step forward in
achieving the goal of the Bankruptcy Act, in distributing the bankrupt's
estate in a manner that will be most equitable to all concerned.
JAMES ARTHUR KERN
13 Supra note 1, at 609, 610.
14 See Note, 57 MIcH. L. Rxv. 1227, 1231 (1959) at footnote 16 in which 11 states
are listed as having statutes designed to protect general as well as lien creditors
against unperfected security transactions of the debtor. In most states, includ-
ing Wisconsin, such transactions are subject to attack only by a creditor levy-
ing attachment or execution. 4 MOOl, CoLLIER ONT BANKRUPCy §70.51, at
1424-34 (14th ed. 1959).
15 See Weintraub, Levin & Beldock, The Strong-Arm Clause Strikes the Belated
Chattel Mortgage, 25 FORDHAm L. Rxv. 261 (1956) ; Marsh, Constance v. Har-
vey--The Strong-Arm Clause Re-evaluated, 43 CALIF. L. Rmv. 65 (1955);
Seligson, Creditor's Rights, 31 REF. J. 113, 118 (1957); MacLachlan, Two
Wrongs Make a Right, 37 TExAs L. REv. 676 (1959).
' 52 Stat. 881 (1938), 11 U.S.C. §110(e) (1952). This is the only section in which
the trustee's rights are derivative. Under §60, 64 Stat. 25 (1950), 11 U.S.C.
§96 (1952), he may recover certain preferential transfers made by the bank-
rupt within 4 months of bankruptcy; under §67(a), 66 Stat. 427 (1952). 11
U.S.C. §107(a) (1952), he may invalidate judicial liens obtained against the
rupt within 4 months of bankruptcy; under §67(a), 66 Stat. 427 (1952), 11
U.S.C. §107(d) (1952) he may set aside other types of fraudulent conveyances
made within one year.
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